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1 Valgrisenche is a secondary valley on the southern side of the Aosta Valley. It runs for
some 40 kilometres in a north-south direction from its opening at Arvier, in the major
groove of the region, to the ridge on the border of Tarentaise. 
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Photo 1. Panorama of Arvier today: The black square indicates the castle of La Mothe and the white
square the village of Leverogne, from both sides of the gorge shaped by the Dora di Valgrisenche
River
Photo Alessandro Celi
2 In civil and religious terms, it comprises a single municipality and one lone parish, today
divided into 16 villages. Its identity is marked – both in the minds of the people and in
scientific literature – by a paradox: Valgrisenche is a poor and isolated valley, rich only
“de  berrio  et  de  rocs”  (“in  stone  and  rocks”),  but  its  inhabitants  are  very  wealthy.
According to a saying that Bernard Janin (1991) recorded and that is reminiscent of the
anti-Semitic background in which our Western civilisation is steeped, they are “the Jews
of the Aosta Valley”. This contradiction is related to other factors, identified by several
authors during the 19th century who praised the population’s “fair reputation of honesty”
(Gorret-Bich, 1877) and described them as “laborious and efficient” (Bethaz 1877) and as
having the “most active arms [and] the most religious hearts” throughout the region
(Fénoil, 1887).
3 Although Valgrisenche is comparable to the surrounding valleys regarding morphology
and the conditions of their traditional economy, it has retained a particular identity that
has  spanned  three  centuries,  and  even  today,  the  Valgriseins have  a  reputation  –
sometimes  positive  and  sometimes  negative  –  that  distinguishes  them  from  other
inhabitants of the Aosta Valley.
4 We can compare Valgrisenche with the Rhêmes Valley on its eastern border because they
both are very long and separated from the main valley by a very narrow gorge at their
entrance. Actually Valgrisenche is less closed than Rhêmes, as the Col du Mont provides
easy access to the Isère Valley and thus favoured favouring trade in years past. 
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Photo 2. The Col du Mont 
Photo Alessandro Celi
5 Valgrisenche is different from La Thuile on its western side because access to the Little
St-Bernard Pass (2,188 m.) is much easier than to the Col du Mont (2,646 m.). Moreover,
the valley has never experienced a tourist boom comparable to the one that led to the
creation of the La Rosière–La Thuile ski resort. It also differs from Sainte-Foy-Tarentaise,
the village at the foot of the French side of the Col du Mont, which until the end of the
Second World War “was the real centre of gravity of the upper [Isère] valley, owing to
both its agricultural and pastoral resources (...) and the absolute and relative weight of its
population in the upper valley” (Bozonnet - Bravard, 1984). Valgrisenche never reached
this level because it lies 20 kilometres far from the main axis of the Aosta Valley.
6 However, the history of Valgrisenche has some points in common with Tignes, a second
site  in  Savoy.  Some  families  of Tignes-based  clothes  merchants,  like  that  of  Bishop
Joseph-Auguste Duc (1835-1922), came to settle in the Aosta Valley in the 18th century,
while the Col du Mont was the preferred route for relatives to travel between the two
sides of the Alps. Tignes and Valgrisenche are also similar by virtue of having built a dam
on their territories after the Second World War. Construction forced the local population
to abandon some of their native hamlets. The controversies and protests between the
inhabitants  and  the  companies  building  the  dams,  which  sometimes  turned  violent
(Fournier, 2000), as well as the memories of the evicted families, put the experiences of
these two communities on an equal footing. Valgrisenche differs from the French case
because the resistance of its inhabitants never reached the level of violence in Savoy.
However, it firmly opposed the building company’s proposals, obtaining some significant
compensations for the people forced to move from their home to seek a new one in other
villages in the Aosta Valley. Even though they were forced to move elsewhere, the people
maintained their own identity and their love for their birthplace. Every year, on the day
Conflict and Identity in Valgrisenche
Journal of Alpine Research | Revue de géographie alpine, 104-1 | 2016
3
of Saint-Grat (September 7), most of them take part in the traditional pilgrimage to the
lake named after this saint who is also the symbol of the community.
7 The  endurance  of  a  sense  of  identity  is  so  strong  that  it  also  enables  people  living
elsewhere to recognise the ones coming from Valgrisenche. This article focuses on the
causes of this endurance. It will examine the founding elements of this identity and their
origins  according to  the rules  of  social  psychology,  which acknowledges  “a  common
history and present” as elements defining a social identity and, at the same time, as the
basis for “shared social action” (Wetherell-Mohanty, 2010). The article will focus mainly
on changes in the borders, along with their effects on the territory, between the 16th and
18th centuries, and the contrasts that garnered strong opposition from the people against
the central national power as well as the acknowledgement of a diversity jealously kept
till today.
 
A territory defined by shifting boundaries
8 As  mentioned in  the  introduction,  the  identity  of  Valgrisenche  is  based on a  set  of
elements that include isolation, poverty and, more generally, some delay in economic
development, which contrasts with the honesty and laboriousness of the residents and
their strong Catholic faith. These elements allowed the establishment of a shared thought
narrative attributing the poverty of Valgrisenche to the State,  which allegedly would
have abandoned the valley in the early 1950s. It was the time of building the dam that
submerged five of its villages, among them Fornet, the seat of a rectory, founded in 1759,
that made it the second centre of the valley, at least from a religious point of view. The
rising waters forced part of the population to leave their homeland and prevented the
growth of tourism in the area, while the rest of the Aosta Valley grew thanks to winter
sports.
9 This explanation, though supported by several authors in the Aosta Valley (Viérin, 1987;
Bois,  2000;  Bétemps,  2002),  seems to be primarily the product  of  both contemporary
political debate and nostalgia. In fact, the reputation of “Jews” attributed to Valgriseins is
based on their ability to work and on the relative affluence of the population, due to trade
relations, which since ancient times have used the path of the Col du Mont. This passage,
though  situated  at  a  higher  altitude  than  the  Little  St-Bernard  Pass,  has  several
advantages for a wayfarer. The route is easy – even in the 17th century it was utilised
“easily and in almost every season by chariots loaded with goods from Saint-Foy” (De
Tillier, 1968) – but above all it is closer to Aosta, the regional capital, and to the road
leaving from Avise and joining the Great St-Bernard Pass across the Vertosan Valley and
the Citrin Pass.
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Map 1. The route between the Col du Mont and the Great–St-Bernard Pass
Alessandro Celi
10 Thus, in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages, the Col du Mont was a very busy trade route, as
evidenced by the Roman literature and medieval archaeological remains. By contrast, in
modern times Valgrisenche became an important military target because of its opening at
Arvier, which allowed French troops to avoid the blockade at the Pierre Taillée, the gorge
that separates Valdigne and the road to the Little St-Bernard Pass from the central part of
the  Aosta  Valley.  As  a  result,  since  the  18th century,  Valgrisenche  has  undergone  a
decisive transformation: Instead of a passage, it became a barrier meant to repulse any
attempt at invasion from the French side. It thus became very isolated because of the new
geopolitical conditions.
11 This change, which permanently marked the local history and identity, is proved by many
fortified sites, whose ruins are still around today. They indicate how both the military
and the fiscal borders moved over the centuries. In fact, during the Middle Ages, control
over Valgrisenche was secured by four castles: La Mothe, Leverogne, Montmayeur and
Planaval. 
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12 Built on the territory of Arvier, at the entrance to the valley, they were supposed to block
access to Valgrisenche from the side of Aosta, not from Savoy. Therefore, their function
was linked to the collection of tolls rather than to a logic of defence, using an approach
also followed on the borders of the Aosta Valley with Piedmont. There, the Susa duty,
which was levied on goods from Savoy, was collected in Carema, the first village in the
Canavese, the area around Ivrea. By contrast,  the military border with Piedmont was
marked by the Bard Fort, a few kilometres west (Celi, 2013). 
13 In  Valgrisenche,  between  the  16th and  18 th centuries,  military  borders  grew  in
importance, and the old castles were abandoned while several new fortifications were
constructed between the main village of Valgrisenche and the Col du Mont.
 
Photo 5. The fortified house of Planaval
Photo Alessandro Celi
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Photo 6. The Planaval Chapel
Photo Alessandro Celi
14 The French invasion of 1536 caused the occupation of Savoy and the Canavese, leaving the
Aosta Valley being completely surrounded by enemy forces. The first contingent from the
Aosta Valley was sent to Valgrisenche to stand guard at the Col du Mont. No battle was
recorded, but the situation was very tense. The continual state of war in the lands of the
Dukes of Savoy between 1580 and 1642 caused the continuous presence of soldiers in
Valgrisenche. In 1597, a detachment was sent to the pass (Duc, 1993); in 1628, men were
mobilised for war, and the lack of workers prevented agricultural work, so the famine
struck all of Valgrisenche; two years later, “the inhabitants found themselves urged by a
detachment of Prince Thomas’s army who, upon returning from Savoy, stopped at this
parish” (Duc, 1995). This time, 1,200 men occupied the houses, forcing the population to
live “in the rock caves like savages”. A similar situation occurred in 1692, during the War
of the League of Augsburg, when the duke sent a regiment of religionnaires to defend the
country after the French raid, which saw the Leverogne Bridge mined and demolished. It
was not until 1748 that Valgrisenche, like other regions of Italy, could enjoy a period of
peace. However, a decisive modification occurred. During this long period of tension, the
arrangements of fortifications had changed. Indeed, a topographic map from the State
Archives of Turin (1703 Map), dated 1703, indicates the presence of fortifications in Col du
Mont and on the Sachère Pass (Bois, 1995). It is worth emphasising this point because it
shows the beginning of the confinement process of Valgrisenche, which ceased to be a
place of passage and became a place of defence.
15 Instead of medieval castles located at the mouth of the valley, the line of defence shifted
to the mountain tops, despite an average temperature lower than in previous centuries.
These fortifications finally reached the Col du Mount and other passage ways used by the
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troops. An interesting example in this regard is the remains of a redoubt built on a rocky
outcrop overlooking the trail between the side valleys of Saint-Grat and of the Alp Vieille.
 
Photo 7. The Montmayeur Castle
Photo Alessandro Celi
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Photo 8. Redoubt on the rocky outcrop
Photo Alessandro Celi
16 Its structure,  although little is  known about it  because it  is  not mentioned on maps,
recalls the fortifications of the modern age, and its position fits perfectly with the logic of
this period. At this time, not only was direct access to the pass defended but so, too, were
the secondary roads leading to the border, according to a design from the principle of the
watershed line,  along with  military  considerations.  From 1792  onwards,  the military
forces gave increasing attention to the paths of the right side of Valgrisenche, which
surrounded the main village, and avoided the fortifications situated between it and the
Col du Mont. A map dating from the War of the Alps reflects these concerns, which led to
the building of a real vallum bisecting the valley. Composed of a ditch and a dry wall of 2
km, with redoubts for the artillery, it stretches along the right side of Valgrisenche, from
the main village to Maison-Forte.
 
Conflict and Identity in Valgrisenche





Photo 10. Maison-Forte, western side: The arrow indicates the second redoubt for the artillery
Photo Alessandro Celi
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17 This name comes from the stone fort that was supposed to block any attempt to outflank
the right side of the valley (Brocherel 1900; Bois, 1995) that was easier to reach. On the
left, the passages were steeper, but it still had to be monitored. To this end, 3,000 soldiers
were stationed in Valgrisenche in October 1792.
 
The story in common: the defence of the Col du Mont
and the myth of Captain Chamonin
18 The revolutionary and Napoleonic period left  an indelible mark on the local  identity
because of the exploits of the local troops. These were organised by Captain Jean-François
Chamonin (1762-1828), a native of the valley. When the regular troops of the King of
Sardinia abandoned their position, Chamonin, refusing to deliver his homeland to the
revolutionary armies, took over the weapons depots and equipment left behind by the
royal army, organised his compatriots and opposed the French so effectively that they
could not get off the Col du Mont for three years (Bois, 2000-2). This veritable popular
defence – in which some see the origins of the Italian Alpini (Pelazza, 1990) – still marks
the  collective  memory  as  evidence  of  Valgriseins’  ability  to  self-organise  and  face




19 In fact, Chamonin had not held any military command before the war, but through their
exploits his hunters showed their skill at using weapons and in self-defence, which is
typical of the entire Aosta Valley but particularly well-developed in Valgrisenche. This
feature derives from the position of the whole region, bordering on the Valais under the
hegemony of the Confederates (mostly Protestants after the Reformation) over Savoy,
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easy to conquer by France, and on Piedmont, for a long time shared between the Savoy
family,  the  Visconti  of  Milan  and  the  Palaeologi  of  Monferrat.  The  need  to  hinder
invasions favoured the practice of weapons;  therefore it  was no coincidence that the
Count of Savoy authorised the first target-shooting on the southern side of the Alps in the
city of Aosta (Angelucci, 1864). Target-shooting was also practised in Valgrisenche, whose
inhabitants were best placed to fear a French invasion and knew the strategic importance
of the Col du Mont. Consequently, they used to train regularly with their weapons. This is
why the troops of Captain Chamonin held the Col du Mont and continued to provide
trusty men to the army and the authorities of the kingdom. For example, in 1862, the
Police Officer in Morgex asked for the National Guard of Valgrisenche to intervene to
check the crossings in the main valley (Celi, 2013).
20 The importance of weapons and the skills of the local troops are deeply rooted in the
history of the Aosta Valley. They bring this area closer to other countries in the Alps: In
the  Vaud,  Abbeys are  still  a  very  important  identifying  practice,  and  in  Tyrol,  the
resistance against Napoleon’s armies became a cornerstone of the local identity thanks to
the leader of the Schutzen and the country’s national hero, Andreas Hofer. This parallel
has only recently been outlined (Celi, 2013), but it is worth noting here. As a matter of
fact, the figure of Captain Chamonin, rediscovered in the late-19th century by the abbés
Bethaz (1877)  and Fénoil  (1887),  became the symbol  of  the independent spirit  of  the
Valgriseins,  if  not  of  the  whole  Aosta  Valley.  This  symbolic  function  was  officially
celebrated in  2000,  when the regional  government  inserted the name and the name
biography of Chamonin into a list of most important Aosta Valley people since year 1000,
in  the book “Les  Cent  du Millénaire”  (Millénaire,  2000),  while  the  city  of  Aosta  had
already honoured the captain’s  memory by dedicating a street to him a few decades
earlier.  The importance of  war in the history of  Valgrisenche came to represent the
people of this valley as one of the most combative of the Aosta Valley.
 
The story in common: the militarisation of the territory
since the Union of Italy 
21 For  Valgrisenche,  the  central  role  of  the  military  experience  continued  after  the
Napoleonic Era. The proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861, and in particular the
signing of the Triple Alliance (1882) with the Austro-Hungarian and German empires,
finally transformed Valgrisenche into a closed military border. During the government of
Italian Prime Minister Francesco Crispi (1887-1896), the valley saw the construction of
several barracks and fortified structures meant to block all crossings towards and from
France. This same type of defence was also set up between Valgrisenche and the Rhêmes
Valley, and between the various side valleys of Valgrisenche. Massive militarisation of the
area began in 1872, when France, after its defeat at Sedan, was not yet a threat. 
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Photo 12. The small barracks granted to captain Ricci at 2,800 m
Photo Alessandro Celi
22 According to the journal of the rector of Fornet, Father Joseph-Bernard Gerballaz (1984),
between 1872 and 1914, with the exception of 1894, Valgrisenche became the scene of
summer manoeuvres of the Italian Alpine troops. Every summer, hundreds or thousands
of soldiers – there were 8,000 in 1892 – trained with mules and guns to get ready to repel
an invasion. The manoeuvres added to the construction of fortified barracks in the main
village and many other structures: A powder magazine north of the barracks was built
around the same time; then some “barracons and huts almost all [...] furnished with beds,
wood, stoves” at the Plan de l’Ours, below the Grand Seinllia, at Plontaz; another one
halfway, then one on the Quatre-Dents Peak, and another, smaller, at the caro (at the end)
of the same edge (…) then at the Forcllia Dou Bré and another over the [Lake of Saint-
Grat]. Four others in various parts of Mount Pellà; then one on the Italian side of the Col
du Mont”, defined as the “true barracks” because it could house 300 men. There were still
others at Alp Vieille and on Mount Ormelune. Below the Quatre-Dents Peak, the army
decided to dig “a basement to keep dynamite that they would have blown up in case the
French passed by [...] to crush the enemy” (Gerballaz 1984). Between 1894 and 1896, there
was still “a hut that was located above the mountains of Alp Vieille, the fortified barracks
[...] of the Morion” (Bois, 1995) and another fort “below the Plan Rochex at the bottom of
Champigny”. 
23 All structures were connected by a network of mule tracks and military roads: In 1890, a
path between the main village and the Petites-Laures was dug in the rock; in 1893, a cart
track from Vercognée to Borègne, a road between Lauves and Mont Pellà, crossing the Alp
Vieille, another one from Prarion to Merlo and a “path from the Bethaz and up to Miollet,
and from there, to Lucé, passing behind the Becca de l’Aouille”. The next year, a path
opened that went through Plan Petey down to Planaval, and in 1897 a trail from Lauves to
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Alp Vieille, above the village of Bonne. Along with these infrastructures, the telegraph
arrived as well, reaching the main village in 1890. That was certainly a service able to
open up Valgrisenche after isolation, but it mainly served the army and the agents of the
“Guardia di Finanza”, the military corps responsible for checking the border to prevent
French spies and, above all, Italian smugglers.
 
Photo 13. The left slope of Valgrisenche, with the Col du Mont indicated by an arrow. Numbers 1 to
6 show the location of military installations
Photo Alessandro Celi
24 This  strong  military  presence  certainly  had  consequences  for  the  local  population.
Unfortunately, the documents looked up for this research do not make it possible to draw
up a general framework of the attitudes of the population towards the military forces.
Some elements, including burglaries at military buildings, still deliver interesting clues.
This  phenomenon  is  also  known  in  the  neighbouring  valleys,  Valsavarenche  and  La
Thuile, but the massive presence of military plants in Valgrisenche is the reason why they
are more numerous than elsewhere. In particular, in 1893, the doors and the wood were
stolen in the Col du Mont barracks, which had just been completed: The commandant of
the garrison had to send a detachment of 10 men to monitor the structure until the snow
arrived. It is certainly possible that the burglary had been organised by the French, but it
is more likely that it was the act of the local population, in order to get wood for heating
and for their buildings more easily. It is possible to identify a second form of resistance in
the habit of increasing the price of groceries when the army arrived. This practice is the
subject of an article published in 1888, when the weekly L’Echo du Val d’Aoste denounced
the “civilian cut-throats” among the population of Valgrisenche who took advantage of
the training soldiers. A second magazine, the Catholic Duché d’Aoste, in 1896 reported on
the protests of the peasants facing the requisition of 40 mule saddles on the occasion of
the Italian expedition to Ethiopia by the anticlerical Prime Minister Crispi. Furthermore,
despite  the  constant  presence  of  the  soldiers,  there  was  no  marriage  between
Valgrisenche  women  and  the  newcomers:  The  community  retreated  and  refused  to
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mingle with the State representatives.  Among the motivations of these behaviours,  it
should be noted that a long quarrel carved an important division between the people and
the central  government.  In fact,  even though the soldiers were building hundreds of
kilometres of trails and military paths in the upper part of Valgrisenche, for over 50 years
the  Italian  general  staff  refused  to  open  a  carriage  road  between  Leverogne  and
Valgrisenche. This refusal weighed heavily on the development of the valley, which was
definitively changed into a place “of stones and rocks” and amplified the local people’s
distrust towards the State.
 
The long road to Valgrisenche
25 The issue of the construction of a carriage road started in 1878, when the municipality of
Valgrisenche asked the War Department to build one between Arvier and the valley’s
main village. This was the beginning of a story that was to play out over almost 50 years.
The general staff refused to grant final permission to the projects submitted by the local
administration in 1890, 1903, 1907, and 1909. In some cases, military reasons or lack of
money were alleged to justify the refusal. Yet the benefits that a carriage road would have
represented for the army were evident to both local administrators and some military
officers. In fact, in 1890 the Division of Military Engineering in Novara, which depended
on the Aosta Valley, sent an officer to draw this road project (Celi, 2011). In the 1903
application, it is well noted that:
26 The state would be most interested in this building because of the strategic position that
the  municipality  occupies  on  the  border  with  France.  Indeed,  at  the  summit  of
Valgrisenche, the military administration built 15 alpine refuges as supply stores and
local cantonment and, furthermore, defensive barracks in the main village (...) Obviously,
if a mobilisation event occurred, such a path [the mule track connecting Valgrisenche and
Leverogne] would make it impossible to supply the troops responsible for defending the
border, and the disadvantage that our troops would have against those of the enemy
would constitute a real danger to the national defence, considering that on the French
side  small  carts  are  widely  used  for  private  transport  to  La  Motte,  a  cottage  two
kilometres away from the frontier on the way from Col du Mont.
27 The same request was also intended to question the strategy of the general staff, who
wanted the borders of the kingdom to be without roads in order to hinder invasions:
28 They claimed that a good road between Valgrisenche and Arvier would make it easier for
the  enemy  to  descend  into  the  Aosta  plains.  This  absurd  assertion  hardly  merits  a
response because it is important above all not to allow the enemies to cross the border. It
is useful even to surprise them at home and especially to occupy high positions promptly.
That’s why a good road is absolutely necessary. Even assuming that the stranger manages
to cross the border, nothing would be easier than to make the road impassable by means
of blasting the mines at appropriate points.
29 The obstinacy shown by the War Department could not be justified by the intrigues of
France,  whose defence system was not  based on the same logic.  Instead,  the French
brought the railway lines to the foot of the main passes, as evidenced by the station at
Bourg-Saint-Maurice, which was oversized to allow the arrival of several trains in case of
mobilisation. Moreover, the events that occurred during the Second World War proved
the  Valgriseins  right.  After  the  campaign  of  June  1940,  the  Italian  general  staff
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acknowledged the strategic importance of a road, especially for the construction of new
bunkers for the “Vallo Alpino del Littorio” (Boglione, 2012), or the Alpine Wall defending
Italian  borders,  and  finally  they  decided  to  open  a  roadway  on  the  basis of  special
wartime legislation (Celi, 2011). The construction started in 1941, but the road was not
completed until after the war.
 
Photo 14. The remains of the Col du Mont barracks
Photo Alessandro Celi
30 It is still remarkable that, at the time when the general staff in Rome refused to construct
the road in Valgrisenche, a decision was taken to build one between Saint-Pierre and
Saint-Nicolas, opposite Leverogne on the left slope of the main valley. This choice was
determined by the need to carry field artillery, with heavy guns drawn by horses, to
positions overlooking both the gorge of Pierre Taillée and the opening of Valgrisenche.
The inauguration of the road – in June 1914, just a few weeks before the outbreak of the
First World War – subsequently allowed the development of tourism in Saint-Nicolas.
Valgrisenche had this opportunity only after the Second World War, but the road, while it
contributed to the opening up of Valgrisenche, also favoured the depopulation of the
same valley and the construction of a dam that changed the landscape and the lives of the
community (Bois, 2000-1).
31 The cost generated by the military presence, as well as the isolation to which the War
Department  had  condemned  Valgrisenche,  also  had  an  impact  on  the  political  and
religious orientation of the population. It should be noted that the clergy of the Aosta
Valley retained great political  influence throughout the 19th century and had quite a
special position, always showing great respect for the royal dynasty but still opposing the
governments – both Liberal and fascist – that were in power between 1849 and 1945
(Merlo, 2012; Celi, 2013). Valgrisenche was not an exception to the rule. The priests there
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had  a  profound  influence  and  continued  to  preach  in  French  during  the  regime  of
Mussolini, who worked for the forced italianisation of the Aosta Valley (Celi, 2008). After
the war, this influence assured the Catholic party of the Christian Democracy the votes of
an absolute majority of the inhabitants of Valgrisenche, from 1948 until 1978, when the
autonomist  movement  of  the  Union  Valdôtaine  became  the  majority  party  in  the
municipality. The loyalty to the Catholic party was the result of passive resistance against
the State, which was interested in Valgrisenche only in order to repress smuggling or
hunting, two activities essential to the survival of the population. This new paradox –
loyalty to a dynasty or a political party holding the power but opposition to the State –
led to the last change in the history of Valgrisenche. The loss of influence of the Church
produced the electoral fall of the Christian Democracy and the growth of the autonomist
movement, even with hints of separatism. Placards asking for the “indipendance” or a
“free Aosta Valley” at the entrance of the snow shed on the road to Valgrisenche proved
the persistence of the ideal of autonomous government in the valley and the importance
of the road as a venue to show support for the people’s political demands (photos 15 and
16).
 
Photo 15, photo 16
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32 The conflicts once manifested against the State are less evident today, as many elements
of discontent have gradually disappeared or decreased, owing to the changes in recent
years.  In  particular,  we  can  highlight  three  major  events,  all  promising  a  boost  to
Valgrisenche without forgetting its past.
33 The first concerns the idea of restoring military structures for tourist purposes. Thanks to
the  European  Commission’s  Konver  funds,  the  fortress  that  controlled  Valgrisenche,
which had been abandoned since 1945, was converted into a restaurant with a dormitory
in  2004.  With  the  name of  “Vieux  Quartier”  (“the  Old  Barracks”),  the  structure  has
become an important tourist attraction for the main village in the valley. The path to the
Col  du Mont,  meanwhile,  has  been the subject  of  intervention thanks to the Alcotra
funding 2007/2013, which has enabled the creation of a “trace trail” supposed to lead the
tourist to discover the history of the pass. Today, there is a project to restore the Captain
Mathieu barracks on top of the Col du Mont and make it a refuge. This would provide a
meeting place for the communities of Valgrisenche and Sainte-Foy and enable them to
develop the ancient existing contacts that had declined because of the turmoil related to
the establishment of the border in 1861.
34 The second event is the partial destruction of the dam. Because of the instability of the
slope, the artificial lake was never completely filled. Thus, the dam could not reach its full
potential. Out of economic and tourism considerations, this situation led to the decision
to reduce the height of the dam. Since 2013, significant work has been carried out, and
the  imposing  dam  no  longer  cuts  through  the  Valgrisenche  panorama.  This  event
provides a new comparison with Tignes. As noted above, the municipality in Savoy also
had a dam that flooded the original location and forced the population to move. Most
recently,  the dam has become a central  element of the television series Les revenants 
(2012), while the mountains of Valgrisenche were the background for the remake of the
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famous film Point Break: Could the two valleys’ future possibly lie in their exploitation by
cinema and television?
Wetherell M., Mohanty C.T., 2010.– The Sage handbook of identities, The Open University.
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ABSTRACTS
Although Valgrisenche, a side valley of the Aosta Valley, is considered to be a poor and isolated
valley consisting of  stones and rocks,  its  inhabitants  are widely known to have considerable
wealth. This contradiction is due to the historical trials and tribulations of the area. In particular,
the presence of the Col du Mont, which provided easy passage to Tarentaise, encouraged the
development of trade that, during the Middle Ages, granted the valley a measure of wealth. By
contrast,  numerous  conflicts  since  the  16th century  caused  the  progressive  closure  of
Valgrisenche.  The valley  became an important  military  target  because  of  its  location,  which
allowed invaders from France to avoid the bottleneck of  the Pierre Taillée that  encloses the
upper part of the Aosta Valley. This article highlights the times of closure and describes the
fortifications that marked the different historical periods. In particular, it demonstrates how the
decisions of the War Department, which for 50 years prevented the construction of a motor road,
led to a delay in the tourist development of Valgrisenche.
INDEX
Keywords: border, Aosta Valley, fortifications, war, identity
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